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BACK TO THE FUTURE? THE USE OF BIOMETRICS, ITS
IMPACT ON AIRPORT SECURITY, AND HOW THIS
TECHNOLOGY SHOULD BE GOVERNED
ERic P. HAAs*
T HE UNITED STATES government is continually developing
and exploring better, more reliable methods of securing
this nation's airports in an effort to stay one step ahead of ter-
rorists in the "war on terror." Since September 11, 2001, the
federal government has established the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) and, within it, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), which is responsible for passenger secur-
ity at the nation's many airports. Commercial pilots are now
able to carry handguns, and federal air marshals are standard on
many domestic flights. Critics argue, however, that more secur-
ity may still be needed. Recent developments include the imple-
mentation of United States Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) and Computer Assisted Pas-
senger Pre-Screening (CAPPS II). Because terrorists are likely
to become familiar with static security procedures over time, the
government must continually respond by introducing newer,
more advanced technologies. Recently the use of biometrics for
identification and security has emerged as a promising new in-
strument in the "war on terror."
Most people are familiar with biometric technology from what
they have observed in science-fiction movies. The most recent
film to showcase the possibilities of biometric technology was
Minority Report.' In the movie, people are continually subjected
to eye scans so that computers are able to identify each person
and then interact with the individual for purposes of targeted
advertising, security clearance, and even law enforcement. In
this futuristic movie environment, mandatory identification is
* The author is a J.D. candidate at Southern Methodist University. He is the
recipient of the Wayne Vines Memorial Scholarship for Aviation Safety.
I MINORITy REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the norm, and it is impossible for anyone to live in anonymity.
However, for better or worse, the technologies of tomorrow are
here today, and biometric identification systems are already be-
ing implemented in airports and other high-profile locales. Fol-
lowing the establishment of the TSA, Congress authorized the
agency to "[p]rovide for the use of ... biometric[s], or other
technologies to prevent a person who might pose a danger to air
safety or security from boarding [an] aircraft. ' 2 Although bio-
metrics and other new technologies show great promise in creat-
ing a more secure community, the newfound security may be
obtained at the price of an individual's right to privacy and right
to travel.
This paper will address whether biometric technology can ef-
fectively protect this nation's airports and borders while still pre-
serving fundamental constitutional rights. In order to evaluate
the constitutional use of biometric technology, this paper will
begin with a survey of the case law surrounding the right to pri-
vacy, the right to travel, and airport screening procedures.' Part
II will give an overview of biometrics and the most popular bio-
metric identifiers. Part III will address current uses of biomet-
rics and how the government plans to implement this
technology in the near future. Finally, Part IV will advocate a
test which the Supreme Court should adopt in future decisions
concerning airport searches and how the test squares the com-
peting interests of safety and privacy in the application of bio-
metric technology.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
AIRPORT SCREENING
A. THE RIGHT TO PRIvAcy-A THEORETICAL SPLIT
The right to privacy is not expressly set forth in the Constitu-
tion; however, courts have generally held the Fourth Amend-
ment to implicitly protect this fundamental individual right.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons.., against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
2 49 U.S.C. § 114 (a)(7) (2004).
3 For purposes of this paper, "airport searches" and "airport screening proce-
dures" will be used interchangeably to refer to standard airport security measures
that apply to commercial airline passengers traveling within the United States
(e.g. metal detectors and luggage x-rays).
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particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized."4 For purposes of analysis, the Fourth
Amendment can be divided into the Search and Seizure Clause
and the Warrant Clause. Over the years, the Supreme Court has
given substance to the guarantees enunciated in the Fourth
Amendment and carved out various exceptions through deci-
sions that have defined the limitations of this constitutional as-
surance. An overview of these decisions will help in defining the
right to privacy that exists today.5
The Supreme Court's opinion in Katz v. United States6 is the
watershed case for modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Katz marked a departure from the traditional view of privacy
rights that had previously defined privacy in terms of common
law trespass. Justice Harlan's now famous concurrence devel-
oped a two-part test for determining occasions in which a right
to privacy should be recognized. According to Justice Harlan's
test, an individual must have (1) a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy and (2) society must be willing to recognize the individual's
expectation as reasonable.7 This test is the threshold question
that must be addressed before engaging in any further Fourth
Amendment analysis, since if there is no expectation of privacy,
then there has not been an occasion to violate that right.'
Assuming that the Fourth Amendment is properly implicated,
a search performed without a warrant is per se unconstitutional,
unless the search falls within a narrowly crafted exceptionY Ex-
ceptions to the per se rule, while rarely made, include the ad-
ministrative search doctrine,'" the Teny rule, 1 and consent.
12
As this brief discussion of Fourth Amendment case law will
demonstrate, courts have thus far been willing to uphold war-
rantless airport searches as constitutional; however, the reasons
4 U.S. CONST. amend. TV.
5 See United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 503 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974) (Oakes,J.,
concurring) ("The entire content of the concept of a Right to Privacy, while it
has many fourth amendment antecedents, is basically a product of the 20th
Century.").
6 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7 Id. at 361 (HarlanJ., concurring).
8 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 904-905 (9th Cir. 1973).
9 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973).
10 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
11 See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
12 See United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1980).
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justifying their decisions have varied greatly."3 The result of this
jumbled case law is a theoretical circuit split regarding the basis
for justifying an airport search within the scrutiny of the Fourth
Amendment. 4 The question is whether the different justifica-
tions that upheld airport searches in the past are still applicable
to present-day airport procedures, which may involve more tech-
nologically-sophisticated techniques, such as the use of
biometrics.
Airport screenings are commonplace today and are almost al-
ways conducted without a warrant. As such, a proper analysis
must focus on the exceptions to the per se rule that justify war-
rantless airport searches. The administrative-search doctrine
emphasizes the distinction made between searches which are au-
thorized by penal statute and searches that arise as a means of
agency adjudication.' 5 An administrative search, which may be
contrasted with a Terry "stop and frisk" search,16 does not re-
quire that the search be supported by a specific showing of
probable cause.' 7 For instance, in New York v. Burger, the Su-
preme Court upheld a statute which authorized warrantless
searches under the auspices of an administrative regulatory sys-
tem.'" The administrative-search exception holds that there is a
reduced expectation of privacy for individuals who operate in
"closely regulated" industries. 9 The exception applies to closely
regulated industries because (1) the government has a more
compelling interest to search those industries that are closely
regulated, and (2) by choosing to operate within the regulatory
arena such individuals are on notice of the governmental over-
sight.2" However, even the abridgement of privacy rights that
accompanies an administrative inspection must meet certain
minimum requirements. 21 As the Court noted, "[f]irst, there
must be a 'substantial' government interest that informs the reg-
13 See United States v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d 596 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
14 The circuit split is theoretical and not factual, because virtually all cases ad-
dressing airport searches have upheld them as constitutional. The difference be-
tween the decisions is the legal basis that justifies the result in each case. Compare
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) with United States v. Epper-
son, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
15 Davis, 482 F.2d at 908.
16 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17 Davis, 482 F.2d at 908.
is 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
19 Id. at 701.
20 Id. at 701-02.
21 Id. at 702.
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ulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made. 22
"Second, the warrantless inspections must be 'necessary to fur-
ther the regulatory scheme.'- 23 And "[flinally, 'the statute's in-
spection program, in terms of certainty and regularity of its
application, [must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate substi-
tute for a warrant. 24
In addition to the regulatory requirements for conducting an
administrative search, the search must be carried out within the
confines of reasonableness.25 Reasonableness may be defined as a
compelling governmental interest that overshadows a conflict-
ing intrusion of privacy. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, the Supreme Court sustained random drug and alcohol
tests performed on railway employees, even though the tests
were deemed to be searches performed without a warrant. 26 Ac-
cording to the Court, "[i] n limited circumstances, where the pri-
vacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where
an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion
would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of
such suspicion. '27 The Court was referring to the compelling
governmental interest of "safety in rail transportation. ' 2 In
reaching this result, the Court held that the reasonableness test
of the Fourth Amendment requires a balancing of individual in-
terests with governmental interests. 29 Justice Kennedy also ob-
served that employees typically consent to significant restrictions
on movement and privacy in the workplace; and in certain situa-
tions, dispensing with the warrant requirement is persuasive
when obtaining a warrant will thwart the objective of the
search. °
Following Skinner, a compelling governmental interest may
render fhe warrant requirement unnecessary by characterizing
the intrusion as a reasonable administrative search, but the
question becomes, what qualifies as a compelling interest. In
the context of airport security, the Fourth Circuit has addressed
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 703.
25 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
26 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989).
27 Id. at 624.
28 Id. at 631.
29 Id. at 619.
3o Id. at 623-26.
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the issue. In United States v. Epperson,3 the Fourth Circuit ap-
plied the search and seizure requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the use of a magnetometer at an airport.12 The
defendant, while attempting to board an airplane, was found
carrying a loaded pistol after passing through a magnetome-
ter.3 The defendant argued that the pistol was the fruit of an
unreasonable search conducted without a warrant.3 4 While the
Fourth Circuit agreed that the use of the device did constitute a
search, the court held that the use of the magnetometer in this
case wasjustified. In reaching this result, the court took notice
that "air piracy and its threat to national air commerce is known
to all."3 6 Thus, "[t] he danger is so well known, the governmen-
tal interest so overwhelming, and the invasion of privacy so mini-
mal, that the warrant requirement is excused by exigent
national circumstances. '3 7 Along the same lines, the Supreme
Court has stated, "It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no govern-
mental interest is more compelling than the security of the
Nation."18
While the presence of a compelling governmental interest is
one way ofjustifying an administrative search, other courts have
defined reasonableness in more general terms without expressly
elevating the need to the status of a compelling governmental
interest.39 In United States v. Edwards, the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined the reasonableness of an administrative airport search by
"balancing the need for a search against the offensiveness of the
intrusion."4 ° The court determined that "[w]hen the risk is the
jeopardy to hundreds of human lives . .. inherent in the pirat-
ing or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the
test of reasonableness, so long as the search is conducted in
good faith ... and with reasonable scope and the passenger has
been given advance notice."41 The effect of this test places a
heavy burden on an individual to overcome a showing that na-
31 Magnetometer is the technical term for a metal detector.
32 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
33 Id. at 770.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 772.
36 Id. at 771.
37 Id.
38 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (citing Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378
U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).
39 United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1974).
40 Id. at 500.
41 Id. (emphasis added).
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tional security is at stake. In response, at least one judge has
expressed concern of possible governmental overreaching in
the test's practical application. Their concern is that individual
civil liberties may be thwarted by an all inclusive "danger" test of
reasonableness, limited only by a condition of "good faith. '42
The Ninth Circuit was the first court to expressly hold that the
administrative search doctrine governed airport boarding proce-
dures. In United States v. Davis,4 the court concluded that a pre-
boarding screening satisfied the test of reasonableness. The
court weighed the need to prevent hijackings against a narrowly
tailored search for weapons and explosives.4 4 In addition to the
requirement that the search be properly limited in scope was
the additional caveat that the individual must be free to avoid
the search altogether by choosing not to board the airplane.45
This element ensures that the intrusiveness of the search is lim-
ited only to individuals intending to board the plane and thus is
consistent with the administrative need to conduct the search.46
Following the decision in Davis, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed
the administrative-search doctrine.47 The court recognized that
reasonableness still remained the critical question regarding the
constitutionality of the administrative search.4" Under the test
of reasonableness, the court held that the compelling govern-
mental interest in preventing air piracy justifies the limited pri-
vacy intrusion required to satisfy the administrative need.4" By
endorsing the administrative exception, the court expressly re-
jected the application of Terry v. Ohio in the context of airport
searches.5" Lastly, in addressing criticism that the exception was
too broad, the court determined that unrestrained governmen-
tal abuse would be curtailed by a self-limiting principle inherent
in an administrative search.5" The principle was that "[s]o long
as the government officials conducting the searches pursue a
single-minded objective . . . searches will ... be no more intru-
42 See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1974) (Manfield,
J. concurring).
43 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973).
- Id. at 910.
45 Id. at 910-911.
46 Id.
47 United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1989).
48 Id. at 1243.
49 Id.
5o Id. at 1247.
51 Id. at 1245.
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sive than is necessary to achieve air safety. 'a 2 However, even
with the administrative exception and its self-imposed limita-
tions, the court was careful to point out that it would not rubber-
stamp any airport search in the name of safety and that it was
the courts' responsibility to remain vigilant against governmen-
tal overreaching. 3
In contrast to the administrative-search exception, a separate
line of cases have justified warrantlessairport searches on the ba-
sis of the Supreme Court's decision in Tery v. Ohio.54 Beginning
with United States v. Epperson,55 some circuits have evaluated air-
port searches under the auspices of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause. In Epperson, the Fourth Circuit held that an air-
port search does not fall into any "recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment except that sug-
gested by Terry v. Ohio."'56 According to the court, "[t]he ratio-
nale of Terry is not limited to protection of the investigating
officer, but extends to others in danger."57 "The warrant proce-
dure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search . . . is
justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonable-
ness is still the ultimate standard."5 " In determining what is rea-
sonable under the Terry standard, the court balanced "the
governmental interest in searching against the invasion of pri-
vacy which the search entails. These interests must be balanced
at two stages: the search must be 'justified at its inception' and
'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place."' 59 Much as other courts
have taken notice of the threat to national security that air
piracy creates, the court in Epperson recognized that "the warrant
requirement is excused by exigent national circumstances. 6 °
The court went on to say
[I] t is clear to us that to innocent passengers the use of a magne-
tometer to detect metal on those boarding an aircraft is not a
resented intrusion on privacy, but, instead a welcome reassur-
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1243-1244.
54 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
55 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
56 Id. at 770.
57 Id. at 772 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)) (internal quotation
marks and punctuation omitted).
58 Id. at 771 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1966) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).




ance of safety. Such a search is more than reasonable; it is a com-
pelling necessity to protect essential air commerce and the lives
of passengers. 61
Following Epperson and along the same lines, the Second Cir-
cuit in United States v. Bell applied the Terry rationale to a chal-
lenged airport search.62 For the majority, it was important that,
prior to the search, the defendant had met the profile of a sus-
pected terrorist and had alerted the magnetometer. 63 In addi-
tion, the defendant had admitted being a prior criminal.64 All
these facts led the court to hold that the officer, who was exper-
ienced in screening suspected terrorists, had conducted the
search within the proscriptions of Terry.
65
While the majority opinion in Bell based its decision on the
foundations of Terry, the other panel judges submitted separate
opinions which addressed concerns and expressed doubt over
the legitimacy of expanding the limits of warrantless airport
searches. In concurrence, Judge Friendly proposed his "danger
alone" test for reasonableness that would later be adopted by
the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Edwards.66 Judge Friendly
stated that he would have no problem sustaining a search based
on nothing more than the intuition of an officer or airline
agent.6v In response to Judge Friendly's extensive dicta, Judge
Mansfield, in concurrence, stated that the threat of airplane hi-
jacking does not justify "a broad and intensive search of all pas-
sengers. "68 Although he joined the court in condoning this
search based upon its facts, Judge Mansfield cautioned that
"[n] o necessity exists for punching a hole in the Fourth Amend-
ment in order to enable the FAA69 and airline authorities to
deal effectively with the air piracy problem."7
61 Id. at 772.
62 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972); cf, United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d
Cir. 1974).
63 Bell, 464 F.2d at 673.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 675 (Friendly, J. concurring); see supra notes 39-41 and accompanying
text.
67 Id., at 675 (Friendly, J., concurring).
68 Id. (Mansfield, T., concurring).
69 Before the establishment of the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was responsible for ensuring
adequate airport security measures.
70 Bell, 464 F.2d at 675 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
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Other circuits have implicitly adopted the Terry rationale and
have upheld the constitutionality of airport searches based on
the proposition that the Fourth Amendment only proscribes un-
reasonable searches and seizures; and therefore, searches that are
reasonable are constitutional.7 1 In United States v. Skipwith, the
Fifth Circuit supported this interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment by reasoning that airport searches are analogous to border
searches.72 Under this rationale, the court applies a less restric-
tive test of probable cause to account for other factors which are
germane to a border search.73 However, in applying the border
search test of reasonableness, the court in Skipwith added an ad-
ditional step and considered the effectiveness of the proposed
search in light of the governmental need and privacy intru-
sion. 4 In dissent, Judge Aldrich favored a more narrow rule
that would be more consistent with the limitations of Terry.75 In
furtherance of this goal, Judge Aldrich proposed that the court
adopt the same standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Mapp v. Ohio,76 excluding property unlawfully seized in order to
"temper possibly overzealous airport searches. 77
Following Bell and Skipwith, the Second Circuit held a search
to be unreasonable under a more restrictive standard. 71 In re-
jecting Judge Friendly's view of reasonableness, the court reaf-
firmed the Terry rationale as controlling law in the evaluation of
warrantless airport searches.79 In so ruling, the court held that
the search was unreasonable because it was "not as limited in its
intrusiveness as it might have been.""° The approach in Albarado
of narrowly tailoring a search to meet the scope of the need was
a corollary of the Supreme Court's decision in Terry."l In adopt-
71 See, e.g., United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972) (adopting the Fourth Cir-
cuit's analysis in United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972)).
72 See Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276 (holding that "standards for initiating a search
of a person at the boarding gate should be no more stringent than those applied
in border crossing situations").
73 See United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1972).
74 Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275-1276.
75 Id. at 1280-1281 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
76 367 U.S. 643, 657-59 (1961).
77 Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1281 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
78 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 810 (2d Cir. 1974).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 809.
81 See Terry v. Ohio, 362 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (stating that "It]he scope of the




ing the Terry standard, the court expressly rejected the conten-
tion that the search might be upheld on the basis of consent.8 2
In dicta, the court reasoned that making a person choose be-
tween either flying or not submitting to a search is tantamount
to coercion because the possibility of finding some other mode
of travel would be unreasonable and unrealistic."
Although only dicta, the words of the Second Circuit regard-
ing consent are contrary to an entire line of cases that have up-
held implied consent to justify Fourth Amendment challenges
to warrantless airport searches. The consent justification traces
its doctrinal roots to the Supreme Court's opinion in Florida v.
Bostick, where the Court held that random searches are not per
se unconstitutional if they are made with an individual's con-
sent. 4 In Bostick, the Court elaborated on its precedent laid
down in United States v. Mendenhall,8 5 which permitted law en-
forcement officers to conduct consensual searches at airports.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, rejected the applica-
tion of a per se rule, and held that, considering the totality of
the circumstances, an illegal seizure does not take place so long
as an individual is "free to decline [an] officer's request or oth-
erwise terminate the encounter."86
The determination of what qualifies as consent and whether
consent can be implied in the context of an airport search is still
a contested issue. In United States v. Davis, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected the assertion that Terry controlled the validity of airport
searches and held that a passenger may implicity consent to a
search by choosing to board a commercial airplane.8 7 Accord-
ing to the court, extending Terry "to authorize airport screening
searches would result in intrusions upon privacy unwarranted by
the need.'88 While mentioning its plausible application in the
case, the court did not elaborate any further on the issue of con-
sent and instead chose to remand the case to the district court
for comprehensive consideration of the issue.8 9
After Davis it was apparent that the Ninth Circuit would be
willing tojustify an airport search based on implied consent. Ac-
82 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806.
83 Id. at 806-07.
84 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
85 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
86 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436-440.
87 482 F.2d 893, 905-13 (9th Cir. 1973).
88 Id. at 907.
89 Id. at 915.
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cordingly, in United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo90 the court held that
"passengers placing luggage on an x-ray machine's conveyor belt
for airplane travel... impliedly consent to visual inspection and
limited hand search of their luggage."91 In so holding, the court
acknowledged that its decision was in line with other circuits
that had upheld airport searches challenged under a theory of
implied consent.92
In United States v. Henry, the Ninth Circuit re-addressed the
theory of implied consent in the context of an airport check-
point search, and again the court held that a warrantless search
was not unconstitutional since the individual had impliedly con-
sented to the search by attempting to board the plane.9 3 In ar-
riving at its decision, the court took notice of the fact that the
public is well informed about airport security procedures, and in
this case, there were even signs that informed passengers that
they could refuse to be searched.94 However, notice is only one
part of the equation; the consent must be "freely and voluntarily
given" and such a determination must be made "on the basis of
the totality of the circumstances. '95 According to the court, "the
crucial factor is whether [the suspect] could have freely with-
drawn the briefcase and avoided the search. 96
While the Ninth Circuit initially embraced the implied con-
sent argument in initial challenges to the constitutionality of air-
port searches,9 7 the court has since changed its justification to
the administrative-search exception to validate warrantless air-
port searches.9" As a result, the continued feasibility of the im-
plied consent rationale in this context has been brought into
question. According to the court, while passengers may still be
seen to impliedly consent to a search that is limited in scope to
9o 800 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1986).
91 Id. at 901.
92 Id. at 902; see, e.g., United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 776 (11th Cir.
1984); United States v. Wehrli, 637 F.2d 408, 409-410 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. DeAngelo, 584 F.2d 46, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Williams,
516 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1975).
93 615 F.2d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 1980).
94 Id. at 1228-1229 (noting that anyone refusing to give consent to be searched
would not be permitted to board the airplane).
95 Id. at 1230.
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Henry, 615 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d
899 (9th Cir. 1986).




weapons and explosives, they "would be surprised to learn that
they are also submitting to a more generalized search for ...
things that are not in themselves illegal but merely look suspi-
cious. "" In dicta, the court went on to suggest that "[i]ndeed,
we doubt that the government could extract so broad a consent
as a condition for boarding an airplane."1 °° While notice may
be antecedent to a finding of implied consent, "the government
cannot 'avoid the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment by noti-
fying the public that all telephone lines would be tapped or that
all homes would be searched." 1 1
The most recent case addressing the constitutionality of a war-
rantless airport search is United States v. Hartwell.112 The court in
Hartwell acknowledged the divergence of opinion surrounding
airport searches and determined that the implied consent ratio-
nale was still a viable justification.10 3 While previous decisions
have discussed the right of a passenger to choose not to fly and
thereby avoid a potential search,10 4 the court in Hartwell held
that once an individual has triggered an alarm, the option of
avoiding a subsequent search by choosing not to fly is no longer
present.0 5 To hold otherwise would give potential terrorists the
equivalent of a get-out-of-jail-free card." 6
So far, the Supreme Court has declined to address the issue of
the proper analysis to adjudicate the validity of a warrantless air-
port search. Nevertheless, the Court has provided guidance re-
garding the limits of the Fourth Amendment and technological
innovation. The most recent interpretation was the Court's
opinion in Kyllo v. United States.10 7 While, as previously dis-
cussed, a warrantless search is presumptively unconstitutional,
determining what amounts to a search has been a more difficult
question."0 ' In Kyllo, the Court held that the use of a thermal
imaging device for determining the amount of heat within an
individual's home was an unreasonable search.10 9 In reaching
this result, the Court distinguished its holding in Dow Chemical
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. (quoting 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.6(g) (2d ed. 1987)).
102 296 F. Supp. 2d 596 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
103 Id.
104 See Davis, 482 F.2d at 910-911.
105 Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 605-606.
106 United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 776 (11th Cir. 1984).
107 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
108 Id. at 31.
lo9 Id. at 40.
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Co. v. United States, which had previously allowed the use of en-
hanced aerial photography of an industrial complex.11 ° The
level of technology employed in Dow Chemical appeared to be
very similar in Kyllo, but as the Court explained, Dow Chemical
was "not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where
privacy expectations are most heightened."11' The conclusion
to be drawn from Kyllo is that the Court is more concerned with
where a search takes place than the type or sophistication of
technology used in facilitating the search.
B. THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL-A DIFFERENT SIDE OF THE
SAME COIN
Although the Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Clause
is frequently evaluated in order to determine the reasonableness
of security measures, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,
which preserves an individual's right to travel, should also be
factored into any Constitutional evaluation concerning security
proposals. The Supreme Court recognized the right to travel in
Kent v. Dulles.'1 2 The Court held that the right to travel is found
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and there-
fore, the Secretary of State may not abridge that right by refus-
ing to issue a United States passport on the mere suspicion that
the applicant is a communist.113 While the decision in Kent was
concerned with the right to travel internationally, in subsequent
decisions, the Court has held that the "[c]onstitutional right to
interstate travel is virtually unqualified."1 4 Unlike the right to
privacy, however, the right to travel is more ambiguous. The
right to travel has been enunciated in numerous Supreme Court
opinions, and its origins have been found in no less than ten
separate places in the Constitution." 5
110 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)
(upholding a warrantless search of a backyard by means of aerial surveillance).
111 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237 n.4.
112 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
113 Id. at 125-127.
114 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
15 See Christopher S. Maynard, Note, Nine-Headed Caesar: The Supreme Court's
Thumbs-Up Approach to the Right to Travel, 51 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 297, 314 (2000)
(reporting that the right to travel has been found in "the Commerce Clause, the
Comity Clause, the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, Implied Fundamental Rights, and the Citi-




One theory asserts that airport searches implicitly limit an in-
dividual's right to travel by imposing invasive mandatory
searches under the guise of implied consent or the administra-
tive search exception. In response, proponents of the more rig-
orous security measures are quick to point out that individuals
concerned about the invasion of privacy may still continue to
travel uninhibited by car, rail, or ship. The Ninth Circuit, in
addressing this counter-argument, has said, "[a] passenger is
not, of course, compelled to travel by airplane, but many trav-
elers would reasonably conclude that they had no realistic alter-
native."' 6 However, in an apparent contradiction, the Ninth
Circuit has also said that airport security measures can be seen
as protecting the public's freedom to travel from terrorist inter-
ference, rather than abridging the individual's right.117
In United States v. Bell, the Second Circuit plainly rejected any
right to travel argument in opposition to the anti-hijacking mea-
sures in place at the time.1 18 According to the court, "[a]ny sug-
gestion that the defendant's constitutional right to travel has
been improperly interfered with would be amusing in other cir-
cumstances. We are trying to assure that right for the public
and the resulting inconvenience of the few should be at least
tolerable." 1 9
The right to travel is not an unqualified right.1 20 Neverthe-
less, the right to travel may not be conditioned upon the relin-
quishment of the right to privacy. 121 This leads to a contorted
view of the right to travel. The right, while found in many dif-
ferent places, is not unconditional, but it cannot be conditioned
upon the giving up of a fundamental right. Therefore, a logical
estimate of the restrictions which may be imposed on the right
to travel are most likely to be similar to the restrictions sur-
rounding abridgement of the right to privacy: reasonableness.
This determination is not very helpful because, as previously dis-
cussed, reasonableness can be a very amorphous standard.
1 22
116 United States v. $124, 570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1248 n.8 (9th Cir.
1989).
117 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 n.59 (9th Cir. 1973).
118 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
119 Id. at 674.
120 Davis, 482 F.2d. at 912.
121 Id. at 913.
122 See United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating
that "reasonableness may vary with circumstance").
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At least one court has reached this same conclusion regarding
the right to travel. The Ninth Circuit has stated that "govern-
mental restrictions upon freedom of travel are to be weighed
against the necessity advanced to justify them,"1 23 and a restric-
tion may only be justified "by a clear showing that they are nec-
essary to promote a compelling governmental interest. 124
Unquestionably, this standard mirrors the test applied in a right
to privacy determination. As a result, reasonableness in the
right to travel context may be presumed for security measures
which also satisfy reasonableness in a right to privacy
determination.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY
Airports around the country and abroad are beginning to util-
ize biometrics for security and identification purposes. Biomet-
ric technology utilizes the unique characteristics of an individual
in order to recognize or identify that person. 125 Biometric iden-
tifiers include any characteristic that differentiates one person
from another: fingerprints, hand geometry, retina scans, iris
scans, gait, facial imaging, voice recognition, or DNA.126 Al-
though, as the previous list demonstrates, the types of biometric
identifiers are vastly different, biometric systems operate within
the same standard structure.
When a digital biometric measurement is first collected, it is
reduced to a number or code and then stored in a database.
Once a database is compiled, whenever a biometric measure-
ment is taken, it is compared to other measurements previously
stored in the database to see if there is a match. 127 In this way,
biometric characteristics function as human passwords-they
are unique to the individual, cannot be forged, and cannot be
stolen. 121 Indeed, some biometric identifiers are more optimal
121 Davis, 482 F.2d at 912.
124 Id. at 913 n.57 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642-44 (1969)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
125 Arun Ross, Salil Prabhakar & Anil Jain, An Overview of Biometrics, at http://
biometrics.cse.msu.edu/info.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
126 A.K. Jain, A. Ross and S. Prabhakar, An Introduction to Biometric Recognition,
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS FOR VIDEO TECHNOLOGY, SPECIAL
ISSUE ON IMAGE- AND VIDEO-BASED BIOMETRICS, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 7-11, January
2004.
127 Ross, Prabhakar & Jain, supra note 125.
128 Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Human Bar Code: Monitoring Biometric Technologies in
a Free Society, POLICY ANALYSIS, Sept. 17, 2002.
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than others, in terms of security, efficiency, and reliability.129
The best biometric identification systems for wide-scale public
use are accurate, non-invasive, capable of accommodating large
amounts of information, and accepted by the general public.1"'
Biometric identifiers such as DNA, hand geometry, or gait are
not widely used or accepted. These identifiers are either too
invasive to gain wide-range acceptance or not individual enough
to facilitate broad-scale implementation. For domestic and in-
ternational airports, the most promising biometric measure-
ments are digital fingerprinting, facial recognition, and iris
scans."' As will be seen, these three types of biometric measure-
ments hold the most possibilities for wide-scale implementation
in security and identification.
A. FINGERPRINTING
Fingerprinting is the oldest, most widely known form of bio-
metric identification. 132 Compared to other biometric identifi-
ers, fingerprinting is one of the least expensive systems to
employ. No two fingerprints are the same, so fingerprints can
be accurately matched.1 33 In addition, the FBI has already com-
piled a database of approximately 70 million fingerprints.' Be-
cause fingerprinting has been around for such a long time,
many people have become accustomed to its use, but for the
same reason, others have attached a criminal stigma to the use
of fingerprinting. 13 5 The use of fingerprints does have other
drawbacks. Inkless fingerprint scanners have been fooled sim-
ply by breathing on the sensor, and fingers with cuts, scrapes, or
scars may not be recognizable.' 3 6
129 Salil Prabhakar, Sharath Pankanti, & Anil K. Jain, Biometric Recognition: Secur-
ity and Privacy Concerns, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, March/April 2003, at 36.
130 John Kavanaugh, National Identity Register Could Be An Expensive Flop, Warns
BCS, Computer Weekly.com, at http://computerweekly.co.uk/articles/article.
asp?liAritclelD=127588&liArticleTypeI (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
131 LeelaJacinto, Biometrics Takes Flight After Terrorist Attacks, ABC News.com, at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/CuttingEdge/WTC-biometrics0l0921.
html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
132 Salil Prabhakar & Anil Jain, Fingerprint Identification, at http://biometrics.
cse.msu.edu/fingerprint.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
133 Jain, Ross & Prabhakar, supra note 126.
134 Id.
135 Prabhakar, Pankanti, & Jain, supra note 129, at 39.
136 Brett Glass, Balky Biometrics, ABC News.com, at http://www.abcnews.go.
com/sections/scitech/zdm/biometric securitypcmag031229.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2004).
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B. EYE ScANs
There are two types of biometric measurements that can be
taken from a person's eyes: retina scans and iris scans. The ret-
ina is the conglomeration of blood vessels located at the rear of
the eye.137 A retina scan is one of the most secure biometric
identifiers because the retina is not easily modified or copied.3 '
However, obtaining a reliable retina scan is a semi-invasive pro-
cedure that requires close interaction with special eyepiece that
must focus a light stream towards the back of the eye in order to
take the image."' Furthermore, a retina scan may reveal more
about the person than merely their identity.1 40
A better alternative to using the retina may be the iris, which
is the colored region of the eye that surrounds the pupil.141
Like the retina, an iris is distinctive and difficult to tamper with,
but unlike its ocular counterpart, an iris scan is fast with virtually
no discomfort.14 2 Also, testing has shown that the iris is more
secure than a fingerprint.1 43 Iris scanning technology is cur-
rently being tested and developed at London's Heathrow air-
port as a way to more efficiently identify foreign citizens as they
pass through customs. 1 44 If the Heathrow testing is successful,
New York's JFK airport and Washington's Dulles airport will
consider implementing iris scanning technology as well. 145 The
weakness, as some critics have pointed out, is that assembling a
database of terrorist's irises is highly improbable, if not com-
pletely unrealistic.' 4 6 Also, in previous tests, some scanners been
fooled by merely putting a picture in front of the sensor.147
137 Jain, Ross & Prabhakar, supra note 126.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. (In addition to identification, a retina scan may reveal medical condi-
tions or drug use).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Jacinto, supra note 131.
144 Airport tests passenger eye IDs, BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/
1808187.stm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
145 Id.
146 Addie S. Ries, Comment: America's Anti-Hijacking Campaign-Will It Conform to
Our Constitution , 3 N.C.J. L. & TECH. 123, 148 (2001).




Facial imaging is a one of the most manageable, non-invasive
means of biometric identification.14 Facial imaging systems can
scan large numbers of people in high traffic settings. For exam-
ple, in 2001, Tampa Bay police utilized facial imaging to moni-
tor fans as they entered the Superbowl. 149 Casinos have been
utilizing facial recognition technology for years.15 ° Unlike its
fingerprint or iris scan counterparts, facial recognition does not
"require the cooperation of the person being identified." '151 Ac-
cording to biometric advocates, facial recognition systems can
identify persons as they age or change hairstyles. Unfortunately,
the systems sometimes have problems viewing persons at differ-
ent angles or in different light.'1 2 Moreover, individuals may be
able to evade an accurate measurement simply by wearing a hat
and sunglasses. This is an example of the correlation between
invasiveness and accuracy-the less invasive the biometric tech-
nique is, the more difficult it is to obtain a reliable measure-
ment. Thus, what facial recognition loses in accuracy, it
compensates for with covertness.
D. THE ROLE OF DATABASES
A collection of biometric information is only as useful as the
operator's ability to effectively organize it and rapidly access
it. 5 ' Thus, the heart of any biometric identification system is
the database, which contains all the previously stored biometric
identities for base comparison. The information life cycle of a
database can be separated into four stages: collection, use and
disclosure, processing, and retention-destruction.' Some advo-
cates argue that biometrics themselves are harmless; rather, it is
their use in databases, which link the biometric measurements
148 Jain, Ross & Prabhakar, supra note 126, pp. 7-11.
149 Vickie Chachere, Biometrics Used at the Super Bowl to Detect Criminals in Crowd,
ABC News.com, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/DailyNews/
superbowlbiometrics_010213.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
150 Simon Liu & Mark Silverman, A Practical Guide to Biometric Security Technol-
ogy, IT Professional, at http://www.computer.org/itpro/homepage/jan-febOl/
security3.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
151 Gail R. Light, Security vs. Liberty: Weighing the Options, MSU Today, Spring
2002, available at http://www.msutoday.msu.edu/research/index.php3?arti-
cle=20Jun2002-9.
152 Jain, Ross & Prabhakar, supra note 126.
153 John J. Brogan, Comment, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of
Facial Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 65, 69 (2002).
154 US-VISIT Program, Increment 1 Privacy Impact Assessment, Dec. 18, 2003.
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to other sensitive information, that makes them invasive. 5 ' Ac-
cordingly, the invasiveness of biometric technology is directly
correlated to the structure of the underlying database.156
The government's attempt to construct a national database
that would utilize biometric identification has many privacy ex-
perts worried about Big Brother. 157 Often privacy concerns arise
because government officials do not implement enough con-
trols to properly guard the public's interest. 58 By concentrating
governmental information in a central database, the possible
risk of identity theft is increased along with the scope of the
harm if someone's identity is compromised.159 In order to con-
trol the invasiveness of information acquisition, the distinction
between public and private databases should be properly main-
tained in a decentralized format. 6 °
E. UTILIZATION OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY
Although biometric identifiers may be useful in potentially
solving a litany of problems, the most obvious is the current is-
sue of identity theft. Because of their ability to verify a person's
identity, travel documents and identification cards that utilize
biometrics are gaining popularity and acceptance. Also, an in-
creasing number of airports are considering the use of biomet-
rics to decrease the time spent at security checkpoints. 6 ' The
use of biometrics in almost all cases will constitute a search; how-
ever, whether the search is subject to Fourth Amendment scru-
tiny has yet to be determined.
III. THE APPLICATION OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY
IN AIR TRAVEL
The examination of the case law surrounding the right to pri-
vacy and the right to travel highlights some threshold questions
155 Dennis Carlton, Integrity and Security at the Borders: The US VISIT Program,
Testimony to the House Select Committee on Homeland Security (Jan. 28,
2004), at http://www.biometricgroup.com/US-VISIT.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2004); see also, LarryJacobs, Attacking Terrorism-And Privacy?, ABC News.com, at
http://abcnews.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
156 Brogan, supra note 153, at 82.
157 See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Inc. 1949).
158 Chachere, supra note 149.
159 Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identifica-
tion Systems, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 319, 337 (2002).
160 Id.
16, Biometrics for Safer Air Travel, findBiometrics.com, at http://www.findbi-
ometrics.com/Pages/airport-articles/airports_4.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
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regarding the legitimacy of using biometric technology and its
place in airport security. In order to strike an equitable balance
between privacy and security, biometric technology must be de-
veloped and utilized in the least intrusive, most effective manner
and under the control of realistic safeguards. Furthermore, due
to the theoretical split in authority dealing with the legitimacy of
airport searches, new proposals must undergo multiple evalua-
tions in order to account for the distinctive nuances of each jus-
tification. This paper will address current and future uses of
biometrics and whether each may be reconciled with the funda-
mental rights discussed above.
A. US-VISIT
On October 28, 2003 the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) unveiled United States Visitor and Immigrant Status In-
dicator Technology (US-VISIT)162 Beginning January 12, 2004,
visitors from selected countries that enter the United States at
various ports of entry will be photographed and fingerprinted
by Customs officials.16 According to the DHS, the use of bio-
metric identifiers will make security more effective than the use
of name databases alone, especially since persons will not be
able to claim another's identity or forge travel documents. 16 4
The biometric data that the DHS gathers will be securely stored
in a governmental database and made available only to author-
ized officials.165 Nevertheless, US-VISIT is sure to encounter is-
sues of privacy relating to the use of digital fingerprinting, facial
recognition, and centralized databases.
Initially, US-VISIT will apply only to "covered individuals." '66
Covered individuals are defined as "nonimmigrant visa holders
traveling through air and sea ports. "167 Following the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,16 such a
program will probably not fall within the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court addressed
the scope of the Fourth Amendment, which protects "the peo-
162 US-VISIT FACT SHEET, findBiometrics.com, at http://www.findbiometrics.




166 US-VISIT Program, Increment 1 Privacy Impact Assessment, Dec. 18, 2003.
167 Id.
168 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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ple."' 69 According to the Court, "'the people'. . . refers to a
class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this coun-
try to be considered part of that community." ' v The Court
went on to say that " [t] he Bill of Rights is a futile authority for
the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores.'1 71
Thus, as long as US-VISIT only applies to covered individuals,
the protections afforded by Fourth Amendment will not
apply.' 72
As described, the US-VISIT program raises concerns regard-
ing the collection of sensitive biometric identification, use of the
information, and database management. In an attempt to quell
some of those concerns, the DHS has appointed a privacy officer
to oversee implementation of the program and utilization of the
information collected.1 7 3 Yet, administrative controls must be
more explicitly defined and enforced in order to effectively reg-
ulate the immense database network that US-VISIT has
created. 174
Moreover, it is possible US-VISIT will not remain limited to
covered individuals. Although the US-VISIT program is still in
its infant stages, government officials have already suggested
modifying the program to facilitate general airport security. 175
The most recent proposal for the government's modified system
has been named "Trusted Traveler. ' 176 Initially available only
on a volunteer basis, individuals would submit to a background
check and then receive a card which identifies the individual as
a "trusted traveler. '177 This "smart card" is secured from forgery
or theft by the addition of a biometric identifier such as a finger-
169 Id. at 265.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 271 (quoting Bridges v. Wixen, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945)).
172 While the program may remain limited to covered individuals, the United
States will need to incorporate biometrics into United States passports and simi-
lar travel documents or risk having them become the instruments of choice for
terrorists seeking to avoid the biometric requirements of US-VISIT. See Carlton,
supra note 155.
173 US-VISIT Program, Increment 1 Privacy Impact Assessment, Dec. 18, 2003.
174 Id.; see alsoJohn Pallatto, What Price Security? US-VISIT, eWeek, at http://
www.eweek.com/print-article/0,3048,a=116163,00.asp (last visited Jan. 31,
2004).
175 Sara Kehaulani Goo, U.S. to Push Airlines for Passenger Records, Washington
Post, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A8504-2004Jan11?.
176 Report Calls for Trusted Traveler System and Offers Alternative to CAPPS II, RPPI.
org, at http://rppi.org/052903.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
177 Id.
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print or an iris scan.' 7 8 According to the government, "Trusted
Traveler" would increase airport security, while simultaneously
decreasing the amount of time passengers spend at security
checkpoints. 179 However, the program may create a de facto na-
tional identification card and institute a class system of air travel,
which has troubled many opponents of the program.18 0
The idea of a national identification card is not novel but has
recently gained renewed momentum with the government's ef-
forts to increase national security. The latest derivative of a na-
tional identifier is the smart card. A smart card is the size of a
driver's license or credit card and is encoded with a biometric
measurement from its owner."81 The smart card relieves the
need to have an independent biometric database, since the bio-
metric information is stored on the card itself. Implementation
of the "Trusted Traveler" program would require consent; but if
displaying the card were a prerequisite to boarding an airplane,
then questions arise as to whether the consent is truly
voluntary.1 8 2
The smart card is generally publicized as a convenience.
Smart cards are already being used to control access to re-
stricted airport areas, and the TSA has begun to issue employees
tamperproof ID badges with biometric components.' 3 Because
the card allows persons to be accurately identified with biomet-
ric verification without the need for any further validation, there
is a reduction in security time and expense. In fact, similar tech-
nology is utilized by individuals everyday, without any mention
of privacy.'8 4 But some feel "[r]equiring photo [identification]
to travel and creating databanks for profiling passengers' per-
sonal travel habits invades the privacy of millions ... and threat-
178 Barbara De Lollis, 'Trusted-traveler' card could speed security check, USA Today,
at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/ news/ 2002/07/02/trusted-traveler.htm (last
visited Feb. 13, 2004).
179 Id.
180 Sobel, supra note 159, at 359; see also Press Release, ACLU, Color Profiling or
Racial Profiling? What is the Difference? (July 12, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release
ACLU] (on file with author).
181 RUWANTISSA I.R. ABEYRATNE, AVIATION TRENDS IN THE NEW MILLENIUM 75-76
(Ashgate 2001).
182 See United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1247 n. 8 (9th
Cir. 1989).
183 Association of Flight Attendants Supports Biometric Security Systems, BiometriTech
2003, at http://www.tmcnet.com/biometritech/02/042402a.htm (last visited Jan.
20, 2004).
184 For example: Tollway tags, Grocery Store Club Cards, and "Smart" Credit
Cards.
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ens their right of privacy without materially affecting the safety
of the flying public." ' 5
Additionally, the smart card can be viewed as a means of elec-
tronic surveillance. The Supreme Court is not unfamiliar with
the concept of electronic surveillance; indeed, the Court's deci-
sion in Katz was a product of unwarranted government eaves-
dropping."8 6  In subsequent opinions, many justices have
expressed deep concern that such intrusions will eventually evis-
cerate the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 8 7 Specifi-
cally, Justice Douglas, opined that "the use of [uncontrolled]
electronic surveillance . . .promises to lead us into a police
state."1 88
The right to privacy may be said to include the right to ano-
nymity. There was once a time when, if you obeyed the law, no
one would pay attention to your comings and goings. In fact the
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to address that
very question in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Circuit of Nevada."8 9 At
issue is "whether an individual has the right to refuse to identify
himself to a law enforcement officer before arrest."' ° The out-
come of this case will have a definite impact on future litigation
involving privacy rights, since the right to anonymity and free-
dom from government surveillance are implied in the right of
privacy.
B. CAPPS II
In conjunction with the introduction of US VISIT, the DHS
and TSA are planning to initiate an updated system for screen-
ing commercial airline passengers. 9' Computer Assisted Pas-
senger Pre-Screening (CAPPS II), which is set to replace the
airlines' existing system (CAPPS I), has many privacy advocates
concerned, since the program will require airlines to turn over
all passenger records and other personal information to the
TSA.19 2 The information collected from the airlines is then
185 Sobel, supra note 159, at 359.
186 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
187 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 760 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
188 Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
189 Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 540 U.S. 965, (2003).
190 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Circuit of Ne-
vada, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/hiibel/default.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2004); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 59 P.3d 1201 (Nev. 2003).




processed by a commercial database in order to validate the
identity of the passenger. 193 After each individual is identified,
the program will cross-reference the passenger with private gov-
ernment databases containing terrorist intelligence, criminal
records, and other undisclosed variables.194 The result is a "risk
factor" denominated by either a green, yellow, or red color
code.195 These codes are then used to determine whether a pas-
senger should be subjected to additional scrutiny or perhaps ex-
cluded from flying altogether.1 9
6
Such an accumulation of information by the government has
many civil libertarians worried. 97 But according to the chief
privacy officer at the DHS, "if the databases are merged, the gov-
ernment would impose strict rules about which agencies can use
the passenger information and how it could be used." '198 To
many citizens concerned about governmental intrusion, this
guarantee is of little comfort.
While profiling is not new to airport security, the CAPPS II
program seeks to utilize profiling in a more invasive and contro-
versial way, compared to the system in place under CAPPS I. A
few court decisions briefly addressed profiling when it was first
introduced by the government in early 1970's as a means of re-
ducing incidents of air piracy. In United States v. Skipwith, the
defendant argued that a search that was partly based on a pro-
file was unreasonable.1 99 While the court acclaimed profiling as
a "useful tool" in combating air piracy, it expressed doubts as to
whether the profile alone would satisfy the reasonableness test
and ultimately decided the case on other grounds without find-
ing the need to address the profile question.20 0
The Third Circuit also touched on the use of profiling in
United States v. Slocum. 20 1 The defendant proposed that "the Pro-
file" was used as an inappropriate means of establishing proba-
ble cause by way of statistical comparisons.20 2 Like the Fifth
Circuit, the Third Circuit failed to address the issue regarding





198 Goo, supra note 175.
199 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).
200 Id.
201 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972).
202 Id. at 1183.
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the legality of "the Profile.1213 Instead, the court concluded that
"solely because the Profile operates on the basis of statistical
comparison... [does not necessarily mean] it should be consid-
ered as an attempt to establish probable cause. °2 0 4 As a result,
"the Profile" fell outside the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.20 5
Profiling is problematic and controversial because it is con-
trary to the constitutional presumption of innocence. With the
use of profiling, a search takes place without any probable cause
or individual suspicion. Instead, the suspicion is based on statis-
tical probabilities. 20 6 Based on the results of a CAPPS II risk as-
sessment, a traveler may be subjected to increased scrutiny or
barred completely from boarding an aircraft. While most chal-
lenged security measures impede the right to privacy or travel,
barring a person from boarding an aircraft based on nothing
more than statistical probability completely eradicates that right
and is unheard of in the United States legal system. Such a pro-
gram invalidates the presumption of innocence and substanti-
ates action based on nothing more than the individual's
statistical intent without the support of a complementary actus
reus element.
"[N] o court has ever approved a dragnet search of all citizens
in a highcrime [sic] area of any urban center, based upon the
justification that the danger of criminal conduct would be re-
duced. ' 20 7 However, "a dragnet" is exactly how the Director of
the ACLU's Technology and Liberty Project has described the
CAPPS II program.28  "[P]rofiling presupposes the right to
scrutinize citizens in ordinary circumstances. ' 20 9 Furthermore,
the use of profiling eradicates one of the safeguards relied upon
in past airport search cases, that "the net can sweep no wider
than necessary since the broad right to search is limited to the
last possible point in time and space which could protect the
aircraft, the boarding gate. 210 In support of profiling, some




206 Sobel, supra note 159, at 365.
207 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 n.4 (5th Cir. 1973).
208 Press Release, ACLU, supra note 180. ("CAPPS II is illusory security on the
cheap... [i] nstead of zeroing in on suspects based on real evidence of wrongdo-
ing, it sweeps every airline passenger through a dragnet.").
209 Sobel, supra note 159, at 366.
210 Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276-1277.
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everyone reduces the effect of stigma as well as the overall level
of intrusion since only persons meeting the profile are singled
out for more invasive searches. 211 This way the government is
able to better focus its efforts on those persons that qualify for
increased screening and increase the overall effectiveness of the
search.
212
With regards to the DHS security initiatives, the most invasive
threat to individual privacy is the possible merger of US-VISIT
with elements of the CAPPS II program. The product would be
the plot Minority Report brought to reality-all persons would
be biometrically identified and potentially barred from air travel
based merely on statistical intent. 213 This scenario is likely in
light of the opposition surrounding the current CAPPS II identi-
fication scheme. Many civil liberty organizations have opposed
the collection of personal information from passengers that is
then used to verify that the passenger is who he or she claims to
be. An alternative to the unwarranted collection of personal
data would be to employ biometrics in the same capacity as the
US-VISIT program for identification. This alternative would re-
duce the cost of passenger identification by simply expanding
US-VISIT to apply to all travelers, not just those entering the
country. Indeed, "Trusted Traveler" contains elements of both
programs (background checks and biometrics for identifica-
tion); although at the moment on a volunteer basis only.214 But
how could citizens be sure that the program would not spread to
other modes of travel or other aspects of society?2 15 As Judge
Oakes wisely observed, "lt] oday airports, tomorrow some other
forms of search which may be applied to everyone. "216 There is
little doubt that this type of program would not qualify as merely
a limited intrusion on privacy.
211 See United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1183 (3d Cir. 1972).
212 De Lollis, supra note 178.
213 See supra note 1.
214 But see De Lollis, supra note 178 (stating that "Trusted Traveler" is not truly
voluntary because "the price of not having one of these cards is going to be even
more intrusive questioning and searches").
215 Press Release, ACLU, supra note 180.
216 Edwards, 498 F.2d at 502 (Oakes, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
emitted).
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IV. ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS
To date, no reported court decisions have specifically ad-
dressed the constitutionality of either US-VISIT or CAPPS I.2"7
However, if history is an accurate predictor, the trend is likely to
be short-lived. In the late 1960's, the FAA initiated an anti-hi-
jacking program in response to the threat of air piracy. At the
time of the program's implementation, airport screening proce-
dures were not uniform and incidents of air piracy were at all-
time record numbers. In the years following its establishment,
the new anti-hijacking initiative faced an array of court chal-
lenges questioning the program's constitutionality; 21 8 and as a
result, a new body of law was developed. Thus, as the effects of
US-VISIT and CAPPS II on the traveling public become more
apparent, a new cluster of cases will begin to make their way
through the federal court system and another string of authority
will begin to emerge.
As cases come forth to challenge the constitutionality of US-
VISIT and CAPPS II, the courts will most likely rely on the air-
port search cases of the 1970's with a renewed inquiry regarding
how these programs should be evaluated. In light of the na-
tional security ramifications surrounding judicial scrutiny of
these programs, a uniform method of review should be adopted.
Under the circumstances presently facing security personnel to-
day and in light of the recent establishment of the DHS and
TSA, US-VISIT and CAPPS II should be reviewed under the ad-
ministrative-search exception to the Fourth Amendment.
The administrative-search doctrine is appropriate for a num-
ber of reasons. First, the commercial air travel industry qualifies
as a closely-regulated industry. Second, by establishing the TSA,
Congress has specifically set up a regulatory scheme to monitor
airport security, and reasonable airport searches are necessary to
further that objective. Third, the government has a compelling
interest in preventing another terrorist attack. Finally, the ad-
ministrative-search doctrine is better suited to preserve property
and balance competing government and individual interests
than either the Terry rule, or implied consent.
217 Some civil liberties organizations have initiated litigation concerning the
disclosure of airline records to the government in relation to CAPPS II testing
and implementation.
218 Specifically, the cases challenged the use of profiling, the magnetometer,
and physical searches taking place at the boarding gate. See supra notes sections(I) (A) -(B).
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The implied consent exception to the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment is not properly applied in the context of airport
searches because such consent is the product of inadvertent co-
ercion. Determining whether consent has been given is a fact
intensive examination based on the "totality of the circum-
stances." If adopted, a highly factual inquiry would be required
to determine if the consent in each case was "freely and volunta-
rily given." Such a rule would quickly prove to be inefficient to
adequately address multiple privacy challenges based on ever-
changing technology. An even more compelling reason not to
adopt implied consent is the trend of recent cases that have
questioned the rule's continuing viability in the context of air-
port searches.
Likewise, the Terry exception to the rule against warrantless
searches should not apply to airport searches. The rule in Terry,
while instructive, is based on the reasonable suspicion of the in-
vestigating officer. As such, the exception contains a subjective
perception of the officer and could not be used to objectively
review standardized security programs that pertain to millions of
air travelers. Additionally, because the Terry rule is based on the
presence of cause, the CAPPS II program would allow Terry to
overlook otherwise invalid searches on the basis of the statistical
cause established by the CAPPS II risk assessment.
Although, in the past, the administrative search doctrine has
applied only to the regulated industry in question, due to the
suitability of the exception to general airport searches and the
incongruity of Terry and consent, the exception should be ex-
tended to apply to all individuals tangentially related to the in-
dustry, including passengers. With the rule so modified, as
courts review the employment of biometrics technology, US-
VISIT, or CAPPS II under Fourth Amendment scrutiny and ap-
ply the administrative search doctrine, some aspects of the pro-
grams, in their current state, will probably not pass
constitutional muster. In taking the programs into considera-
tion, relevant factors to the determination should include the
reasonable scope of a program, the presence or absence of no-
tice, and the overall level of invasiveness compared to the pro-
gram's efficiency.
Any search utilizing more invasive technology must compen-
sate with greater effectiveness. Collecting biometric measure-
ments and doing background checks involves a greater intrusion
than citizens have previously realized. Taking into account the
current state of the technology, its debatable faults, and the fact
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that such a system has never been implemented or tested on
such a broad scale, the costs may outweigh the promised
benefits.
Lastly, a warrantless airport search should be specifically tai-
lored according to the security need in order to be reasonable.
"Even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. '219 But for commercial air passengers, the
use of general profiling under CAPPS II and universal biometric
tracking under US-VISIT can hardly be classified as specifically-
tailored.
V. CONCLUSION
As biometric technology is rapidly advancing, its current state
of effectiveness still leaves much to be desired. In terms of rea-
sonableness, the advances offered by biometric technology as it
now stands do not offer the gains in security that are expected
with the corresponding invasion of privacy that occurs when bio-
metric technology is implemented.
Society should be apprehensive of technological advances
that threaten to invade previously undisturbed areas of life. The
words of Justice Douglas more than thirty years ago are still ap-
plicable to the circumstances that citizens face today.
Invasions of privacy demean the individual. Can a society be bet-
ter than the people composing it? When a government degrades
its citizens, or permits them to degrade each other, however be-
neficent the specific purpose, it limits opportunities for individ-
ual fulfillment and national accomplishment. If America permits
fear and its failure to make basic social reforms to excuse ...
electronic surveillance, the price will be dear indeed. The prac-
tice is incompatible with a free society.22 °
"[H]istory reveals that the initial steps in the erosion of indi-
vidual rights are usually excused on the basis of an 'emergency'
or the threat to the public. But the ultimate strength of our
219 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 912-913 (9th Cir. 1973) (quoting Shel-
don v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1961)).
220 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 764 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(quoting R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 287 (1970)).
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constitutional guarantees lies in their unhesitating application
in times of crisis and tranquility alike. ' 21
While biometric technology provides vast potential for im-
proving security, it may be at too high a price in terms of lost
privacy, individuality, anonymity and liberty. If programs such
as US-VISIT and CAPPS II become assimilated into our way of
life, then what liberty is there left to protect? While creating a
police state may insulate the United States from many types of
terrorism, it will substitute one inequity for another and in the
end may create more problems than it solves.
221 United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 502 (1974) (Oakes,J., concurring);
see also Laura Dawn Lewis, So What Do We Have?, commentary following Press
Release, ACLU, supra note 180. (suggesting that if done in incremental steps,
"society accepts [ ] each adjustment with little resistance via rationalizations of 'it
is for your own good.' Study Germany in the 1930's and this is exactly how the
country changed.") (emphasis in original).
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